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Irregular Kelo Takings: A Potential
Response to Natural Disasters
Fredrick E. Vars*
A REcoRD 62 TORNADOS HIT ALABAMA on April 27, 2011, resulting in
247 fatalities.' In Tuscaloosa alone, 5,362 residential structures were
damaged or destroyed.2 Among them were houses along 14th Place
East. Seven lots in one section looked like this:
With the exception of the parcel at the bottom left, all of these lots
are needlessly "irregular," by which I mean non-rectangular. Several
studies (described below) have shown that irregular parcels sell for
less than similarly situated rectangular lots. Thus, after the tornado
and before rebuilding, the government might have been tempted to
*Associate Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. J.D., Yale; A.B.,
Princeton. This essay was inspired by Bob Ellickson, Meador Lecture, University
of Alabama School of Law on Mar. 2, 2012 which can be found at http://www.law.
ua.edu/resources/podcasts/lectures.php (last visited May 23, 2012), who also provided
very helpful comments on an earlier draft. Thanks as well to Ian Ayres, Tom Bier,
Tom Bogart, Bill Buckholtz, Adam Cox, Heather Elliott, Caroline Harada, Grace
Lee, Gary Libecap, Alberto Lopez, Andy Morriss, Trevor O'Grady, Charlie Post,
Ken Rosen, and John Strok. Charles Slowikowski and the University of Alabama
law library staff provided excellent research assistance. Thanks finally to Dean Ken
Randall and the law school foundation for research support.
1. Mike Oliver, April 27's Record Tally: 62 Tornadoes, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Aug. 4,
2011, at 1.
2. Chris Pow, Tuscaloosa's April 27 Tornado by the Numbers, AL.COM (Oct. 27,
2011, 8:50 AM), http://blog.al.com/tuscaloosa/2011/10/tuscaloosas-april27_tornado
b.html (reporting numbers from the Tuscaloosa mayor's office).
square the lots to increase property tax revenue. 3 The result would
look like this, with no change in square footage:
In fact, this did not happen. But should it happen after future disas-
ters? And could it? The answers depend first on the strength of the evi-
dence showing increased value for rectangular lots. In section I of this
essay, I will summarize existing research in this field, then report the
results of my original data analysis. The conclusion is that rectangular
lots are probably somewhat more valuable than irregular shaped lots.
But, even if there are modest gains to be had by squaring lots, is it
within the government's power to force those gains? Section II exam-
ines that question through the lens of the controversial United States
Supreme Court case, Kelo v. City of New London,4 and its legislative
aftermath.
I. Are Rectangular Lots More Valuable?
A. Previous Literature
Five prior studies addressed the question of whether irregular lot shape
reduces urban parcel value.' The first study examined 123 random
real estate sales from 1976 to 1984 in Halifax and Dartmouth, Nova
Scotia.6 According to this study, irregular lot shape reduced value
3. Other actors-like owners and developers-might feel the same temptation, but
transaction costs are likely to be prohibitive. Government could act to reduce those
costs rather than redrawing lines itself.
4. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
5. A sixth study evaluated agricultural land and found a significant advantage for
rectangular parcels. Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and
the Role of Coordinating Property Institutions, 119 J. POL. ECON. 426 (2011).
6. Paul K. Asabere & Barrie Harvey, Factors Influencing the Value of Urban Land:
Evidence From Halifax-Dartmouth, Canada, 13 AREUEA J. 361 (1985).
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by 40% or more, and the effect achieved statistical significance in
most specifications. Adjusted R2 ranged from 0.50 to 0.55.8 (R2 is
a measure of how well the model fits the data. It is generally between
0 and 1, where 1 is a perfect fit.)9
The second study comes from another peninsular city but on the op-
posite side of the continent: Seattle, Washington.10 It also found a stat-
istically significant negative effect of irregular shape: a reduction in
value of 67%." This study's dataset was much larger: 80,926 King
County sales of single-family homes from 1984 to 2002.12 Control
variables included, inter alia, zoning codes and school districts; how-
ever, the R2 was only 0.20.13
The third study focused on the island of Manhattan. 14 Using a data-
set of 68,208 residential property sales in New York City between
1990 and 2002, the study found a statistically significant positive
1.3% irregular shape effect on price per residential unit and no statisti-
cally significant effect on total price.' Similarly, there was no signifi-
cant effect for vacant land zoned residential." This suggests little or
no lot shape effect. These models included both census tract fixed
effects and community district variables. 7
The final two studies focus on Japanese cities. One reviewed trans-
actions of vacant land from 1975 to 1987 in the central business dis-
trict of Tokyo.'s From a regression predicting sale price, the author
concludes that "an irregular-shaped lot is about 42% less valuable
than a regular-shaped lot" (p<0.01).1 9 A more recent Japanese study
included both Tokyo and Kitakyushu, a medium-sized city, but limited
7. Id. at 372-73.
8. Id.
9. See Perry A. Zirkel & Andriy Krahmal, Creeping Legalism in Grievance Arbi-
tration: Fact or Fiction?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 243, 250 (2001).
10. Christopher R. Cunningham, House Price Uncertainty, Timing of Development,
and Vacant Land Prices: Evidence for Real Options in Seattle, 59 J. URB. EcON. 1
(2006).
11. Id. at 18.
12. Id. at 4, 6, 9, 18.
13. Id. at 18.
14. Yun-chien Chang, An Empirical Study of Compensation Paid in Eminent Do-
main Settlements: New York City, 1990-2002, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (2010).
15. Id. at 221. R2 was 0.87 and 0.64, respectively.
16. Id. at 222. N was 1,305 and R2 was 0.79.
17. Id. at 221-22.
18. Kazuhiko Fujiki, A Study on CBD Land Value Variations (Aug. 1989) (unpub-
lished M.S. dissertation, University of British Columbia), available at https://circle.
ubc.ca/handle/2429/27261.
19. Id. at 82, 85.
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itself to vacant residential lots.20 Regressions from each city showed
statistically significant negative effects for irregular shape. The magni-
tude of the effect in Tokyo is difficult to discern given complicated
model specification.21 In Kitakyushu, the researchers claim that regu-
lar shape increased value by 11.9%,22 but their model, properly inter-
preted, actually showed an increase of 5.8%.23
B. The Present Study
The City of Cleveland, Ohio, was selected for this study due primarily
to data availability. As a basically flat midwestern city with few nat-
ural obstacles to urban planning and development, it fills a gap in
the existing literature. Cleveland is also subject to natural disasters
that could present the motivating question for this study: more than
900 tornadoes struck Ohio between 1950 and 2010.24
The source of the data is the Cuyahoga County auditor. The most
recent major reappraisal was conducted in 2006. In that year,
177,660 parcels were in Cleveland. Observations were excluded for
several reasons: missing and non-residential land use codes, air rights,
condominiums, duplicates, and so forth. Table 1 summarizes the var-
iables of interest.25
The key results appear in Table 2. The irregular shape dummy-
equal to one for irregular lot shapes and zero otherwise-is negative
and statistically significant in each model. For all residential proper-
ties, irregular shape reduces value by 6.4% (1 - e-0.0662). Coefficients
on the control variables have the predicted signs and are statistically
significant. Dividing the residential property by type, there is a 1.4%
reduction in land value for irregular lots zoned for single family
20. Xiaolu Gao & Yasushi Asami, Effect of Urban Landscapes on Land Prices in
Two Japanese Cites, 81 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 155 (2007).
21. Id. at 161.
22. Id. at 162.
23. Id. The source of the error was setting SHAPE equal to minus one if the lot was
irregular, then interpreting the coefficient as if SHAPE had been set to zero for irreg-
ular parcels.
24. Rich Exner, Details of Ohio's Tornadoes Since 1950, THE PLAIN DEALER (Aug.
25, 2011), http://www.cleveland.com/datacentral/index.ssf/2009/05/details-of-ohios_
868 tomadoes.html.
25. Missing values in the variables listed in Table I together required omission of
2% of observations.
In a personal email to the author, John Strok of the Cuyahoga County Office of Fis-
cal Officer stated that the lot shape variable is "secondary," not used in the county's
appraisal, and therefore subject to coding error. E-mail from John Strok, Cuyahoga
Office of Fiscal Officer, to Fredrick E. Vars, Associate Professor, Univ. of Ala. School
of Law (May 4, 2012, 03:05 PM) (on file with author). Such errors would likely lead
the present study to underestimate lot shape effects.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean
Assessed Land Value ($) 16440.14
Irregular Shape 4.56%
Irregular Shape & Smallt  0.18%






t"Small" is lot size at or below the 10th percentile of vacant residential parcels (2145 square feet).
homes, a 5.2% reduction for multi-family home lots, and an 8.5%
decrease for vacant lots.
One question that follows from the relatively large effect for vacant
lots is whether small, unbuildable lots are driving the result. The final
column of Table 2 assesses this possibility by adding to the model a
dummy variable equal to one if the lot had an irregular shape and
was in the bottom 10th percentile of vacant residential lot size (and
zero otherwise). The coefficient on this variable was positive and
did not achieve statistical significance, tending to rebut the unbuild-
able hypothesis. 26
Thus, irregular shape appears to have a small but significant nega-
tive effect on assessed land value. But perhaps the property owners
disagree with the auditor. I tested this possibility two ways: first, by
examining the assessed value of buildings on the theory that property
owners will put more valuable buildings on rectangular lots, and sec-
ond, by examining actual market transactions (also from the Cuyahoga
County auditor's file).
The first test yields a negative result. Lot shape and assessed build-
ing value are not significantly related in any of the three models (Table
3). Nor was there a relationship between irregular shape and sale price
for developed residential property (Table 4, columns 1-3). The sur-
prise here is with vacant lots, which showed a statistically significant
positive effect of irregular shape (+29.0%; Table 4, column 4). This
26. Setting the cut-off at the 25th percentile (4,200 square feet) yielded the same
result.
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Table 3: The Impact of Lot Characteristics on 2006 Assessed
Building Value
Land Use Code (LUC)
Variable All Residentialt 1 Family 2 or 3 Family
Irregular Shape 0.0060 0.0100 0.0197
(0.0072) (0.0075) (0.0151)
Ln(Lot Size) 0.5804 *** 0.5879 *** 0.5096 ***
(0.0594) (0.0602) (0.1595)
Ln(Lot Size)A2 -0.0254 *** -0.0254 *** -0.0265 **
(0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0094)
Ln(Frontage) 0.5663 *** 0.6129 *** 0.6338 *
(0.0594) (0.0643) (0.1141)
Ln(Frontage)A2 -0.0485 *** -0.0520 *** -0.0722 ***
(0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0150)
Paved Road -0.1711 * -0.0603 -0.0688
(0.0671) (0.0663) (0.1894)
Utilities -0.0646 -0.2373 ** (omitted)
(0.0915) (0.0869)
Level -0.0159 -0.0251 -0.0367
(0.0192) (0.0198) (0.0430)
N 118342 85099 33010
R-squared 0.4827 0.5118 0.5163
See note to Table 1.
tExcluding vacant lots.
* p<0 .0 5 .
** p<0 .01.
*** p<0.00 1.
suggests that the market, unlike the auditor, rather strongly disfavored
rectangular vacant lots.
C. Integrating the Research
Irregular lots in medium-sized cities are probably worth somewhat less
than comparable rectangular lots. This conclusion gives more cre-
dence to the auditor in the present study than to the market, for
three reasons. First, the vacant lot market models in Table 4 have
by far the fewest observations and lowest R2s of the models in this
study. Omitted variables could explain the observed results. The
value of improvements is an obvious confounder. Second, as discussed
below, the public purpose of redrawing lot lines would be to increase
tax revenue, which is driven by assessed value, not by market transac-
tions. Third, transactions are a non-random sample of lots, likely
IRREGULAR KELO TAKINGS 859
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skewed toward lots with uncertain or increasing value. The auditor, on
the other hand, uses market and other information to generate a best
estimate for every parcel, with no selection bias. So this study
shows a reduction in assessed value of between 1.4% and 8.5% for
irregular residential lots.
What about the prior studies? The Halifax study was very small
(N = 123) and did not control for the value of improvements.27 The
failure to disaggregate land value from the value of structures substan-
tially undermines the study's reliability. The same goes for the Seattle
study, which is also suspect because of its very low R2 (0.20).28 The
New York study corrected both deficiencies and found no statistically
significant irregular shape effect for vacant residential lots. 29 That
would be a strong argument against the current study's contrary con-
clusion if the New York study had not relied solely on market trans-
actions. New York is also much larger than Cleveland and unique in
other ways. The two Japanese studies also rely on actual sales and
come from a very foreign cultural and legal framework. In addition,
the first Japanese study lumped together residential and non-residential
property in finding its 42% reduction in value for irregular shaped lots
in Tokyo.30 More plausible and applicable to residential property in
medium-sized cities is the second Japanese study's negative 5.5%
effect in Kitakyushu, 31 which is comparable to the findings of the
present study.
II. Can the Government Redraw Boundaries to Create
Rectangular Lots?
A. The Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution concludes:
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation."32 This so-called Takings Clause constrains all levels of
government. 33 The "public use" limitation has been interpreted broadly
to permit more than just actual use by the public or by government of the
27. Asabere & Harvey, supra note 6, at 370.
28. Cunningham, supra note 10, at 18.
29. Chang, supra note 14, at 222.
30. Fujiki, supra note 18, at 82, 85.
31. Gao & Asami, supra note 20.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
33. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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taken private property. 34 Rather, the touchstone requirement is "public
purpose." 35
As the two figures in the introduction illustrate, straightening lot
lines generally takes some property from Neighbor A and gives it to
Neighbor B in exchange for an equal amount in reverse. However,
in Kelo, the Supreme Court reiterated the long-standing takings rule
that "the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose
of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just
compensation." 3 6 Here, the sole purpose would not be the transfer
from one private party to another, but rather to increase property val-
ues and hence the local government's property tax revenue.
The majority opinion in Kelo expressly left open the question of
whether increasing tax revenue, by itself, could constitute a sufficient
"public purpose." 37 In predicting how the Court would resolve this
open question, the concurring and dissenting opinions are illuminat-
ing. Justice O'Connor in dissent argued that the majority
holds that the sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private
use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is pre-
dicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public-such as increased tax rev-
enue, more jobs, maybe even esthetic pleasure.
38
Justice Kennedy, part of the five-justice majority, responded in his
concurrence that the public benefit must not be merely incidental, pre-
textual, or de minimis.3 9
Increasing tax revenue by squaring lots need not be a secondary, in-
cidental, or pretextual public benefit. The government could legiti-
mately pursue greater tax revenue as a primary and sincere goal. Cer-
tainly, in the current economic environment, an increased tax base
may be a legitimate municipal goal. But, that leaves us to analyze
the goal of an increased tax base under Kennedy's de minimis limita-
tion. There are arguments both ways. This study suggests a 9.3% in-
crease in land value and hence property tax for vacant residential
lots that are squared, rather than irregular shaped. That may sound
substantial, but it amounts to only about $15 per year on an average
vacant lot.4 0 The observed rectangular-shape effect for lots with single
34. See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 477.
37. Id. at 486-87.
38. Id. at 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 490-91, 493 (Kennedy, J, concurring).
40. Rich Exner, Northeast Ohio Property Tax Rates, and Where the Money Goes,
THE PLAIN DEALER (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.cleveland.com/datacentrallindex.ssf/
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family homes is smaller in percentage terms, about 1.4%, but it works
out to $345 per year for an average lot. This means that squaring six
average lots in Cleveland like the ones on 14th Place East in Tusca-
loosa could be expected, if single-family homes are rebuilt, to increase
annual property tax revenues by about $2,068. A single-year increase
of this magnitude is probably not de minimis.
Perhaps more important is that, at least in terms of assessed value,
there are no net losers in the lot redrawing hypothetical. Sure, neigh-
bor A gives up a slice of her property, but she receives an equally big
slice in return, along with an increase in property value. Arguably, this
point belongs in the just compensation portion of the analysis,4 1 but it
is hard to imagine that it would not tilt courts in favor of finding an
adequate public purpose. An owner may have a psychological attach-
ment to her irregularly shaped parcel, but takings law generally disre-
gards such non-market interests. 4 2
B. State Law Constraints
The Kelo case precipitated an enormous backlash. Several states
enacted laws prohibiting takings if the enhancement of tax revenue
is the "primary" or "sole" motivation. 43 These laws would seem to
preclude the redrawing of lot lines contemplated here. A complete sur-
vey of state law is beyond the scope of this essay, but I will examine
the state that framed the study, Alabama, and the state that made it
possible, Ohio.
The Alabama Constitution states: "nor shall private property be
taken for private use, or for the use of corporations, other than munici-
pal, without the consent of the owner."" In case that was not clear, the
Alabama Code specifies that "a municipality or county may not con-
demn property for the purposes of private retail, office, commercial,
industrial, or residential development; or primarily for enhancement
of tax revenue; or for transfer to a person, nongovernmental entity,
2009/01/northeastohio.property-taxjra.html?appSession=288292351668293 (based on
2008 tax rates).
41. Cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 150-51 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
42. See, e.g., Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th
Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.). But cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982) (finding per se taking in part due to "insult" of permanent
physical occupation).
43. James W. Ely, Jr., Post-Kelo Reform: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?, 17
SUP. CT. EcoN. REv. 127, 136 (2009).
44. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
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public-private partnership, corporation, or other business entity."4 5
Therefore, it is obvious why Tuscaloosa did not straighten lot lines
after the April 27, 2011 tornado-it could not lawfully pursue this
tactic even if it would enhance tax revenue.
The Ohio Constitution strikes a different chord, declaring that pri-
vate property shall be held "subservient to the public welfare."46
But Ohio changed its tune after Kelo: "'[p]ublic use' does not include
any taking that is for conveyance to a private commercial enterprise,
economic development, or solely for the purpose of increasing public
revenue," subject to inapplicable exceptions.4 7 Therefore, the door to
redrawing lot lines in order to increase the tax base is likely closed in
Ohio as well.
III. Conclusion
This essay fills a gap in the existing literature on the impact of lot
shape on urban land values. It generally supports the view that there
is a penalty for irregular shape, but of a smaller magnitude than
some prior studies have suggested.4 8 Still, there may be real gains
to squaring lots after natural disasters. This strategy would likely
pass federal constitutional muster, but state law restrictions on eminent
domain passed in response to Kelo may have inadvertently foreclosed
the opportunity. Of course, governments could, and perhaps should,
encourage through other means (like tax incentives) the creation of
rectangular lots through its development and design review process.
45. ALA. CODE § 11-47-170(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
46. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19.
47. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 163.01(H)(1) (West 2007) (emphasis added); see also
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.02 1(A) ("No agency shall appropriate real property except
as necessary and for a public use. In any appropriation, the taking agency shall show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the taking is necessary and for a public use.").
48. Although the focus of this paper is disaster recovery, the premium on rectangu-
lar lots has other obvious implications, e.g., property tax assessment, city planning,
zoning, and private development.
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